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TAKING LIBERTIES: PRIVACY, PRIVATE CHOICE1 AND 
SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORY 
Anita L. A !Len"' 
Decisional privacy arguments-arguments premised on the value 
of freedom from coercive interference with decisionmaking affecting 
intimate and personal affairs-are among the strongest for main-
taining permissive abortion la\A.'S. Yet philosophers and legal theo-
rists from diverse segments of the scholarly community have 
pointed to decisional privacy arguments for permissive reproductive 
rights policies as prime examples of conceptua l confusion, male ide-
ology, and judicial overreaching. First, conceptual confusion has 
been seen in the use of the expression "privacy" to describe free-
dom to choose whether to give birth to a child. Second, male ideol-
ogy has been seen in the articulation of reproductive liberty as a 
matter o f privacy for women, when it is still men who dominate pri-
vate life and ultimately decide women's procreative fates. And 
third , judicial overreaching has been seen in the Supreme Court's 
reliance upon an unenumerated constitutional right of privacy as a 
substantive limitation on legislation intended to protect unborn life, 
women's health, and the family. Each of these criticisms amounts to 
a recommendation that reproductive rights analysis be purged of 
decisional privacy arguments. 
This Article is a defense of decisional privacy arguments against 
charges of conceptual confusion, male ideology, and judicial over-
reaching. In response to Griswold v. Connecticut. 1 Roe v. J!Vade, 2 and 
other reproductive rights cases, a great deal has already been writ-
ten about decisional privacy. Rather than exhaustively reassess all 
the important issues that bear on the jurisprudence of decisional 
privacy, I undertake a pair of more limited tasks. 
In Parts I and II, I clarify the senses in which privacy is impor-
tantly at stake in the choice among competing reproductive rights 
policies. "Privacy" can refer either to conditions of restricted access 
or to decisionmaking free from coercive interference. In Part I, I 
argue that pernicious conceptual confusion about the meaning of 
constitutional privacy, stemming from a failure to carefully distin-
guish privacy in its restricted-access and decisional senses, tarnished 
the Court's earliest procreative rights opinions but does not mar the 
* Associate Professor, Georgetown University Law Center; J.D., Harvard Law 
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1. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
2. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
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most recent abortion cases. The "conceptual confusion" objection 
is thus no excuse either for discounting the importance of judicial 
protection of fundamental reproductive liberties, or for ignoring the 
respects in which privacy is genuinely at stake in the choice among 
competing abortion policies. In Part II, I argue that there can be no 
"male ideology" objection to decisional privacy. The exe rcise of 
privacy-promoting liberties is important for women. I t can foster 
traits and conditions feminists have long deemed paramount, in-
cluding self-determination, participation as equals, and social con-
tribution on a par with innate capacities. Our society would do 
women an injustice were it to deny them decisional p rivacy rights on 
the ground that some men will exploit women 's righ ts to thei.r own 
advantage. 
Part III is devoted to a close critical analysis of David A.J . Rich-
ards' decisional privacy argument for permissive abortion laws. 
Richards' argument deserves more than casual attention . The pub-
lication in 1971 ofjohn Rawls ' Theory of justice revived scholarly in-
terest in social contract theory3 and its implications for the law,4 
while Ronald Dworkin's writings 5 have stimulated widespread as-
sessment of liberal rights-based approaches to jurisprudence.6 
Richards' contractarian, liberal rights-based theory of constitutional 
interpretation has importance as among the most sophis ticated the-
ories of its kind. Responsive to the demands of history, morality, 
and politics, Richards' view that substantive political theory controls 
3. The social contract theo ries advanced by contemporary thinkers who continue in 
the contractarian tradition of Locke, Rousseau, and Kant depict "an idealized moral 
conception of persons as free, rational, and equal ," D. RICHARDS , TOLERATION AN D THE 
CoNsTITUTION 41 ( 1986), and hold that, as a prerequisite of justice, governmental 
constraints on freedom must have the consent of the governed. See generally id. at 41, 57-
63. 
4 . See, e.g., H . BLOCKER & E. SMITH, JOHN RAWLs' THEORY OF SociALJ usncE~ l980) 
(collected essays introducing reader to extensive body o£' literature surrounding Rawls' 
theory of social justice); M. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JusTI CE (1982) 
(advocating primacy of justice but rejecting leading liberal and libertarian theories); 
Lyons, Nature and Soundness of the Contract and Coherence Arguments, in READI NG RAWLS 14 1 
(N. Daniels ed. 1974) (discussion of Rawls' social contract theory). 
5. R. DwoRKIN, LAw's EMPIRE (1986); A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE (1985); TAKING 
RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977) . 
6. Broadly construed, liberalism is the view that individuals are en titled to extensive 
personal liberty and the economic protections called for by such liberty. Liberals come 
in many varieties. There are libertarians , conservatives , liberals, welfare state liberals, 
and so on . Liberals disagree about the nature of the liberty to which persons are e ntitled 
and about the nature of the economic rights adequate liberty entails. See generally NoMos 
25: LIBERAL DEMOCRACY a. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1983) (collection of essays on 
equal representation, fed eral democracy, judicial review, freedom of speech, 
justifications for liberal democracy); RONALD DWORKIN AND CONTEMPORARY 
JuRISPRUDENCE (M. Cohen ed. 1983) (co llection of essays assessing Dworkin's theories). 
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cons titutional interpretation andjudicial review merits applause as a 
reasoned alternative to strict constructivist? and positivist theories. 8 
My main concern will be whether Richards' decisional privacy argu-
ment for abortion rights, set, as it is, in a broad, contractarian theory 
of constitutional interpretation, furthers efforts to justify permissive 
reproductive rights policies . 
Richards' account of why women ought to have procreative fre e 
choice substantiates major strands in what I will refer to as the " fem-
in ist moral stance" for permissive abortion legislation. In Part III , I 
contend that although the woman-centered conclusion of Richards ' 
decisional privacy argument for fundamental abortion rights is cor-
rec t, his premise that unborn life lacks public moral significance is 
inadequately defended. I propose a cure for the defective premise, 
inspired by Dworkin's contractarian conception of the constraints 
on just government imposed by the ideal of liberal equality. I sug-
ges t that the amended version of Richards' decisional privacy argu-
ment is morally compelling. However, I acknowledge that the 
contractarian foundations of his argument would doubtlessly lead 
some feminists to rej ect the insights it offers into the case for wo-
men's procreative liberty. 
I. CoNCEPTUAL CoNFUSION 
A. Two Uses of "Privacy" 
Is the concept of privacy too vague and indefinable for application 
in the law ?9 Privacy is certainly an elastic concept. The expression 
"privacy" has numerous connotations. 10 Theorists have recom-
mended that policy-makers and courts discontinue uses of "privacy" 
7. Strict constructivism is the view that "judges deciding constitutional issues 
should confine themselves to e nforcing norms that are stated or clearly implicit in th e 
writte n Constitution." J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JuDICIAL REVIEW 
I ( 1980); see, e.g. , R. BERGER , GovERNMENT BY THE JUDI CIARY: THE TRANS-
FORMATION OF THE fOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1977). 
8. Legal positivism is the idea that statements about what law is are true or false and 
can be verified by empirical d a ta dra wn from the history of legal institutions. R . 
DwoRKI N, LAw's EMPIRE, supra note 5, at 33-34; see, e.g., H.L.A. HART, THE CoNCEPT OF 
LAW (1961); j. BENTHAM , AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND 
LEGISLATION (J. Burns & H . H art rev. ed. 1970) (1791) . 
9. Several scholars who commented on the Supreme Court's initial application of a 
constitutional right of privacy described privacy as a vague, indefinable concept. See, e.g. , 
Dixon, The Gn.swold Penumbra: Constitutional Charter for an Expanded Law of Privacy, 64 
MICH. L. REv. 197, 199 (1965) (few doctrines are more vague or less amenable to 
definition and structured treatment than privacy); Gross , The Concept of Pn vacy, 42 N.Y.U. 
L. REv . 34, 35 (1967) (concept of privacy is infected with pernicious ambiguities); Shils, 
Privacy: Its Constitution and Vicissitudes, 31 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 281 , 281 (1966) (idea 
of privacy is vague and difficult to ge t into perspective). 
10. See Shils , supra note 9, a t 281. 
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that obscure and confuse. 11 H owever, the concept of privacy is by 
no means too vague fo r the law. Clarity about legal uses of the ex-
pression " privacy" can be achieved where the bas ic distinction be-
tween, first, privacy simpliciter (restricted access) and, second , private 
choice or decisional privacy (freedom from interference ·with appro-
priately private affairs) is preserved. Further clarity is achieved by 
consistent us es of terms like "solitude," " secrecy," and "anonym-
ity" that refer to distinct forms of privacy. 
T wo distinct usages of "privacy" have come to have a place in the 
law. 12 Under the first usage, "privacy" re fers to co nd itions of re-
s tricted access . This usage is in keeping with the popular theore ti cal 
definitions of "privacy" as the inaccess ibili ty of p ersons, their 
mental states, and informatio n about them to the senses and surveil-
lance devices of others .13 Seclusion and solitude are two forms of 
privacy 14 in the restricted access sense. They relate to physical sepa-
ration or isolation from others. Several forms of privacy in the re-
stricted access sense relate to inform ation nondisclosure . T hey are 
!d. 
Numerous meanings crowd in on the mind that tries to analyze privacy: 
... private property; . .. interest in name and image; . .. keeping o f o ne's 
affairs to one's self; ... internal affairs of a voluntary association or of a 
business co rpo rat ion ; . . . phys ical absence o f o thers ... ; des ire .. . n ot to 
disclose or to have disclosed info rma tion ... ; sexual and familial affai rs 
... ; desire not to be o bserved ... ; . .. private citizen in contras t with the 
public official; and these are o nly a few. 
ll. See, e.g .. Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421•, 422 ( 1980) (to be 
useful , concep t of privacy must denote something di sti nc t and coherent); Parent , Privacy, 
Morality and the Law, 12 PHIL. & PuB. AFF. 269, 269 (1983) (privacy should be defined 
with clarity and precision). 
12. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977) (p ri vacy cases have involved 
protection of interests both in avoiding disclosure of personal matters and m 
independence in making certain kinds of important decisions). 
13 . See A. ALLEN, UNEASY AccEss: PRIVACY FOR WoMEN IN A FREE SociETY 11 , 15 
( 1987). Similar restricted access definit ions have been reli ed upon by many theo rists 
from the fields of law, philosophy, and social science. See, e.g., D. O'BRIEN, PRIVACY, LAw 
AND PuBLIC PoLICY (1979) (law) ; S . BoK, SECRETS: ON THE ETHI CS OF CoNCEALMENT AND 
REVELATION (1984) (philosophy); I. ALTMAN, THE ENVIRO NMENT AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 
(1975) (social science). 
14. There is considerable disagreeme nt over what, if anything, can be aptly 
understood as a form of privacy. The usual candidates for the privacy family are secrecy, 
confidentiality, reserve , seclusion , solitude, solace, intimacy, modes ty, and isolatio n . I 
construe terms denoting modes of personal inaccessibility as terms denoting forms of 
privacy. See A. ALLEN, supra note 13, a t 18 . But see Parent , Recent IVork on the Conception of 
P1·ivacy, 20 AM. PHIL. Q 341 , 346-4 7 ( 1983) (concepts in privacy family are wholly 
distinct). There has been especially st riking disagreement over the relat io nship between 
secrecy and privacy. See, e.g., S. BoK, supra note 13, at 10-14 (secrecy and privacy distinct 
concep ts); Friedri ch, Secrecy Versus Privacy: The Democratic Dilemma, in 13 NoM OS : PRIVACY 
105, I 06 U. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1971) (privacy is form of secrecy); Gavison, 
supra note II , at 428 (secrecy is form of privacy). 
··.i 
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secrecy, co nfidentiality, and res erve. Anonymity, construed broadly 
to include limited attention paid to persons as well as nondisclosure 
of their identities, is also a form of privacy in the restricted access 
sense. 
The invas ion of privacy torts 15 protect interests in seclusion, in-
formation nondisclosure, and anonymity by making highly offensive 
intentional diminutions of privacy actionable wrongs . As numerous 
courts have asserted, the purpose of the invasion of privacy torts is 
to protect the sensibilities, feelings, and inviolate personalities of 
natural , living persons .16 The federal Constitution also protects pri-
vacy in the restricted access sense. For exampie, the fourth amend-
ment limits warrantless search and seizure, thereby protecting 
individual and corporate interests in seclusion, information nondis-
closure, and anonymity. 17 Numerous state and federal statutes, and 
provisions of some state constitutions, are also designed to protect 
interests in seclusion, anonymity, and information nondisclosure. 18 
Under its second usage in the law, which appears to be derivative 
of the public/private distinction, 19 "privacy" refers to an aspect of 
15. The four widely-recognized invasion of privacy torts are unreasonable intrusion 
upon seclusion, publication of private facts, publication placing another in a false light, 
and appropriation of name, likeness, or identity for commercial purposes. RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A(2) (1977); Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REv. 383, 389 
(1960). 
16. See generally R. SACK, LIBEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED PROBLEMS (1980) (discussion 
of law of privacy and defamation). "Inviolate personality" was the phrase used by 
Warren and Brandeis to describe the interest protected by privacy rights. Warren & 
Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193, 205 (1890). 
17. Cf Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978) (fourth amendment protects 
homes and commercial premises from unreasonable warrantless searches by federal 
regulatory agencies); Ely, The Wages ojC1ying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE 
LJ. 920, 929 (1973) ("[A]spects of the First, Fourth and Fifth Amendments ... limit the 
ways in which, and the circumstances under which, the government can go about 
gathering information about a person he would rather it did not have .... [L]imiting 
governmental tapping of telephones .. . plainly involves .. . general concern with 
privacy.") . See generally D. O'BRIEN, supra note 13 (fourth amendment is very close to 
express privacy protection). 
18. See, e.g., The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1982 & Supp. III 1985) 
(disclosure of records requirements); Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 
1974, 20 U .S.C. § l232g (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (disclosure of educational records 
requirements) . See generally R. SMITH, CoMPILATION OF STATE AND FEDERAL PRIVACY 
LAWS (1978-79, 1981, 1984-85) (noncumulative editions); U.S. DEPARTMENT OF jUSTICE, 
COMPENDIUM OF STATE PRIVACY AND SECURITY LEGISLATION: PRIVACY AND SECURITY OF 
CRIMINAL HISTORY INFORMATION (1984). 
19. The public/private distinction has been praised as the normative cornerstone of 
liberal society. See, e.g., Berns, Privacy, Liberalism, and the Role of Government, in LIBERTY 
AND THE RULE OF LAW 208, 209 (R. Cunningham ed. 1979) (under liberal theory, public 
realm exists as result of contracts among private persons). It has also been condemned 
as a dichotomy with little normative or descriptive validity. See, e.g., Radest, The Public 
and the Private: An American Fairy Tale, 89 ETHICS 280 (1979). 
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liberty. It refers to freedom from governmental2° or other outside21 
interference with decisionmaking and conduct, especially respecting 
appropriately private affairs. "Appropriately private affairs" is a 
highly value-laden concept. Its extension is construed to include 
matters generally regarded as intimate or personal. As a normative 
distinction, 22 the public/private distinction presupposes that certain 
concerns ought to be left to nongovernmental, family, or individual 
interests. It is often said that intimate, personal affairs ought to be 
private affairs because of their close association with attributes of 
identity and moral personhood. 2 3 
The concept of decisional privacy has been relied upon in consti-
tutional cases and in commentary on constitutional cases relating to 
abortion, 24 contraception,25 and homosexuality. 26 It has also arisen 
in connection with the right to choose one's own spouse,27 to rear 
children in accordance with one's own religious values, 28 and to 
possess sexually explicit materials in one's own home. 2 9 
20. For example, the right to privacy at issue in Griswold v. Connecticut was fr eedom 
from govemmental interference. 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (state anticontraception 
laws unconstitutionally abridge right to privacy) . 
21. For example, among the decisional privacy issues raised by the "Baby Jane Doe" 
neonatal nontrea tment case was whether a person, not the government, outside the family 
circle was entitled to interfere with parental choice. See Weber v. Stony Brook Hospital , 
60 N.Y.2d 208, 456 N.E.2d 1186, 469 N.Y.S.2d 63 (per curiam) (unrelated lawyer 
denied right of intervention through guardian ad litem on behalf of handicapped 
newborn), cerl. denied, 464 U.S. 1026 (1983). Supreme Court cases reviewing spousal 
and parental notification and consent requirements raise the issue of the 
constitutionality of decisionmaking free from interference by government . See Planned 
Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 4 76, 490-93 (1983) (plurality opinion); Akron v. 
Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 439-40 (1983); Bellotti v. 
Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 648, 649-50 ( 1979) (plurality opinion); Planned Parenthood v. 
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52,71 (1976). However, they also raise questions about the right to 
procreative choice free of unwanted interference by "outsiders" who are within the 
family circle, but whom the individual may wish to exclude. See Ashcroft, 462 U.S. at 490-
93; Akron, 462 U.S. at 439-40; Baird, 443 U.S. at 638-49; Danforth, 428 U.S. at 69-75. 
22. There are purely descriptive uses of the public/private distinction, as where 
government employers are termed "public" employers and nongovernment employers 
are termed "private" employers. 
23. Cf Gerety, Redefining Privacy, 12 HARV . C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 233 , 281 (1977) (privacy 
is control over or autonomy of intimacies of personal identity). See genemlly L. TRIBE, 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS 886-98 ( 1978) (attempting to 
classify kinds of interests that count as privacy). 
24. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
25. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
26. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986). 
27. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. I (1967). 
28. See, e.g. , Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
29. See, e.g. , Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969). 
l 
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B. Privacy vs. Liberty in the Abortion Cases 
Some theorists have argued that, although the concept of privacy 
has a p lace in the law, it does not have a place in abortion rights 
cases. T hey maintain that the concept of privacy must be carefully 
distinguished from the concept of liberty, and that the Supreme 
Court's right-to-privacy jurisprudence in abortion cases is Hawed by 
the confusion of liberty with privacy. They conclude that the juris-
prudence of abortion rights is not properly a jurisprudence of 
privacy. 30 
Circumspect usage of terms with key moral and political applica-
tions is indeed always important. Conceptual confusion in the law is 
worri some; in constitutional law it is particularly worrisome in light 
of the paramount political values and individual interests at stake . 
Language must not be permitted to impede justice or obfuscate its 
requirements. However, now that the distinction between the re-
stricted access usage and the decisional usage of privacy is com-
monly made and accounted for, 31 and now that it is understood that 
" privacy" typically means decisional privacy in abortion cases, there 
is not much left of the conceptual confusion argument for purging 
privacy talk from discourse about procreative liberties. Even purists 
who do not approve of the decisional privacy usage of "privacy" can 
appreciate the existence of a legal convention whereby "privacy" in 
abortion cases denotes an aspect of liberty, namely, the absence o f 
governmental coercion respecting appropriately private affairs. 
It must be granted to proponents of the "conceptual confusion" 
objection to decisional privacy arguments that early reproductive 
rights cases reflected a lamentable degree of confusion about the 
meaning of "privacy" and the relationship between privacy and pri-
vate choice. In Griswold v. Connecticut Justice Douglas seemed to con-
Rate privacy and private choice when he raised the spectre of 
government agents spooking the sacred precincts of the marital 
bedchamber to enforce criminal contraception laws.32 The privacy 
of restricted access to the marital bedroom is certainly a reason to 
favor the decisional privacy of free contraceptive choice. Butjustice 
Douglas' words can be read to imply that the constitutional right of 
privacy on which his opinion ultimately rested was essentially a re-
stricted access rather than a decisional privacy right. 
30. See, e.g., Ely, supra note 17, at 932-33. Cf Gavison, supra note II (arguments that 
"privacy" does not aptly apply to procreative freedom); Parent, supra note 11 (same). 
31. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977) . 
32. 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) . 
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Justice Blackmun in Roe v. vVade seemed to conflate restricted ac-
cess privacy rights with decisional privacy rights when he relied 
upon his metaphysically suspect belief that a "pregnant woman can-
not be isolated [presumably, from the fetus] in her pregnancy"33 as 
a ground for limiting her decisional prerogatives. His remark as-
sumes, first, that pregnant women inherently lack privacy, and, sec-
ond, that the claim to decis ional privacy is necessarily weaker where 
one does not possess privacy in the restricted access sense. The first 
assumption is a matter of metaphysical and ethical opinion rather 
than of simple fact. Whether one believes that pregnant women in-
herently lack solitude depends upon the moral status one ascribes to 
the fetus. The truth of Blackmon's first assumption also depends 
upon how privacy is conceived. Arguably, the mere presence of a 
being incapable of perceiving or understanding human conduct 
does not diminish isolation or any other form of privacy.34 The sec-
ond assumption can be thrown into doubt by considering Judith 
Thomson's hypothetical in which a person finds that she has been 
kidnapped by music lovers, taken to a hospital, and attached by doc-
tors to a dying violinist who would expire without her life-support. 35 
Surely the mere fact that she is not "isolated" from the violinist can 
have no moral bearing on whether she has a right to decide whether 
to remain by his side for the nine months his recovery would 
reqmre. 
With the benefit of hindsight and interpreting each of their opin-
ions as a whole, it is apparent that the basic right to privacy Justice 
Douglas and Justice Blackmun sought to apply in Griswold and Roe 
was a right of decisional privacy. Now that the major conceptual 
confusion about what the Justices meant is dispelled, there remains 
the crucial substantive interpretative question of whether a right to 
decisional privacy broad enough to protect abortion choice is im-
plicitly guaranteed through the Constitution's reservation of zones 
of private decisionmaking and conduct. 36 And assuming such a de-
cisional privacy right is constitutionally guaranteed, there also re-
mains the question of what burdens for judicial review the right 
imposes on the Court. These questions are the focus of Part III of 
this Article. 
33. 410 u.s. 113, 159 (1973). 
34. Cf Garrett, The Nature of Privacy, 18 PHIL. ToDAY 263, 264 (1974) (privacy defined 
as limitation on access of one or more entities to entity that possesses experiences). 
35. Thomson, A Defense of Abortion, I PHIL. & PuB. AFF. 47,48-49 (1971). 
36. See Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 106 S. 
Ct. 2169, 2184 (1986). 
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Today it is clear that the fundamental constitutional issue under-
lying Supreme Court abortion cases has been private choice rather 
than privacy. This is not to suggest that privacy itself has nothing to 
do with abortion rights. It is now recognized by the Court that cer-
tain forms of privacy in the restricted-access sense are needed to 
safeguard decisional privacy .37 Important forms of privacy are 
ancillaries to private choice. Cases reviewing the constitutionality of 
spousal or parental notification and consent requirements,38 and 
cases reviewing abortion record-keeping and reporting require-
ments,39 have raised anonymity, secrecy, confidentiality, and other 
information access concerns. Seclusion and solitude concerns are 
raised by state abortion control laws that can only be enforced 
through access to women's bodies by government or its surro-
gates.40 Interestingly, in Roe v. J:Vade the Supreme Court rejected all 
limitations on the power of states to regulate abortion that are pre-
mised on a woman's alleged privacy right to control physical access 
to her body.41 
37. See, e.g., id. at 2182 ("A woman and her physician will necessarily be more 
reluctant to choose an abortion if there exists a possibility that her decision and her 
identity will become known publicly."). 
38. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983); Akron v. Akron 
Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 
662 (1979); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976). 
39. See, e.g., Thombwgh, 106 S. Ct. 2169. 
40. Seclusion and solitude privacy concerns have not had a major role in abortion 
cases. However, they were raised by Justice Douglas' remarks about the perils to the 
privacy of the marital bedroom posed by the spectre of enforcement of 
anticontraception law. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485-86. Antiabortion laws could raise the 
same enforcement problems anticontraception laws raise were convenient abortion pills 
or other abortifacients intended for home use available to women. (The recently 
publicized "once a month" pill, RU 486, developed by French researchers, is an 
abortion pill. It blocks the action of progesterone and prevents implantation of fertilized 
eggs. Murphy, The lvfonth-After Pill: French Doctors Report a New Approach to Birth Control, 
TIME, Dec. 29, 1986, at 64.) 
The requirement of the presence of a second physician during "late-term" abortions 
raises a restricted access privacy issue. From the point of view of the woman undergoing 
an abortion, an unwanted second physician is an intruding government surrogate. 
However, it was not for reasons of constitutionally protected seclusion that the Court 
invalidated the second physician requirement contained in Pennsylvania's Abortion 
Control Act. See Thornbwgh, 106 S. Ct. at 2182-84. 
41. The bodily ownership and control argument for abortion seems to have been 
rejected in Roe, 410 U.S. at 152-54. The Court expressed doubt about the existence of 
"an unlimited right to do with one'& body as one pleases." !d. at 154. The Court also 
denied that a pregnant woman can be "isolated in her privacy." !d. at 159. 
Pro-life activists have urged that abortion, not antiabortion, is the greater affront to 
women's ownership and control over access to their bodies. See, e.g., Cunningham, Is 
Abortion a Women's Issue?: Pro-life, 5 UPDATE 6, 46 ( 1981) ("The abortion procedure is ... 
a radical invasion of the woman's body. It is 'a denial of one of those powers which 
make women women. Child-bearing is basic to them .... To put it bluntly, an abortion 
amounts to a mutilation of the woman's body and a denial of her nature.'") (quoting 
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Forms of privacy such as confidential record-keeping are judicially 
recognized ancillaries of decisional privacy. I will now point to note-
worthy respects in which decisional privacy is itself an ancillary of 
paradigmatic forms of privacy. This reality and its relevance to pro-
creative rights have not yet gained the public or judicial recogni[ion 
they deserve. In the next section I argue that abortion is an effective 
tool women can use to assure adequate privacy in their priv2te lives. 
Plainly, abortion has other important uses. Access to abortion 
spares women for whom pregnancy is an unreasonable health risk, 
who have been raped, who are too young for responsible parenting, 
or who are very poor, from dramatically ruined lives . The potential 
for ruin goes far beyond the loss of privacy. In focusing on argu-
ments for abortion based on the importance of privacy, I do not 
intend to discount the other compelling arguments for a permissive 
national abortion policy. 
II. MALE IDEOLOGY 
A . Privacy Against Women 
For some feminists, "privacy" and "private affairs" connote con-
ditions of female confinement and subjugation in the home. 42 They 
connote the lack of both privacy and private choice for women. 
Catherine MacKinnon has argued that the decisional privacy ration-
ale of Roe is "male ideology." Mere legal rights do not assure wo-
men freedom of procreative choice if men continue to control sex.43 
MacKinnon debunked privacy and decisional privacy by describing 
Smith, Abortion as a Feminist Concern, 4 HuM. LIFE REv. 62, 67 (1978)). It may be 
inconsistent for pro-lifers to maintain both that the fetus is another person and that 
abortion is mutilation of women's bodies. In any event, the pro-life argument untenably 
implies that for a woman, not wanting to bear a child is akin to perversion. It supposes 
that a pro-choice society perverts women. I find no semblance of plausibility in these 
claims. They imply the insult that women who do not wish to have children or cannot 
bear them are unnatural and less womanly. 
42. See, e.g., Okin, Women and the Making of the Sentimental Family, 11 PHIL. & PuB. AFF. 
65, 88 (1985). See generally J. ELSHTAIN, PuBLIC MAN, PRIVATE WoMAN: WoMEN IN SociAL 
AND PoLITICAL T HOUGHT ( 1981) (Western philosophy promoted conception of women 
as belonging to private sphere in condition of inequality). 
43. MacKinnon, Roe v. Wade: A Study in Malt Ideology, in ABORTION: MoRAL AND 
LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 45 Q. Garfield & P. Hennessey eds. 1984) . MacKinnon's argument 
is that Roe does not go far enough toward effecting the radical change needed to 
improve the status of women, but it is not an argument against procreative freedom for 
women. A similar argument, but one aimed against procreative free choice for \vomen, 
depicts Roe as having gone too far. See, e.g., Cunningham, supra note 41, at 46 
("Abortion is ... a successful means of keeping women as sex objects .... [I]f through 
some 'accident' the woman gets pregnant, her lover ... can escape the responsibility ... 
[by offering] to pay for the abortion. It is the ultimate in the exploitation of women."). 
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them as the rig-ht of men to be let alone to oppress women one at a 
time:14 
T here is ample evidence that women's relationship with privacy 
has been difficult. -15 On the whole, women have had too much of 
the wrong kinds of privacy. They have had modesty , chastity, and 
family homes when what they have needed are the forms of privacy 
that foster moral independence. Traditional caretaking roles have 
kept women's lives centered in the privacy of the nuclear family 
home. Conventions of female chastity and mod es ty have shielded 
women in a mantle of privacy at a high cost to sexual choice and 
self-expression. Expectations of emotional intimacy have fostered 
beneficial personal ties. At the same tim e, women's prescribed roles 
have limited their opportunities for individual forms of privacy and 
independently chosen personal association. Maternal and social 
roles have kept women in the private sphere who might otherwise 
have distinguished themselves in the public sphere as business-
\.vomen , scholars, government leaders, and arti sts.46 
Nearly a hundred years ago feminist Charlotte Perkins Gilman 
pointed out some of the many respects in which the traditional roles 
of homemaker, wife, and mother are inconsistent with individual 
forms of personal privacy:17 For many women, homelife has been 
anything but a haven for the experience and enjoyment of personal 
privacy. Meaningful opportunities for personal privacy consist of 
time and a place for oneself. Caretakers cannot seclude themselves. 
Successful mothering demands that women be highly accessible and 
highly responsive to the wants and needs of their children. Incredi-
bly, full-time housewives spend more time on housework today than 
they did in i 900.48 Women in full-time jobs outside the home 
spend thirty-five hours a week keeping house.4 9 A substantial per-
44. MacKinnon, supra note 43, at 49. 
45. Using historical and legal examples, I have elaborated elsewhere the points made 
in this paragraph. A. ALLEN, supra note 13, at 54-81. 
46. Cf S. DE BEAUVOIR, THE SECOND SEx 669-73 (1952). According to de Beauvoir, 
women are isolated in feminity and will not make public contributions until they can 
emerge in sovereign solitude. !d. 
47. C.P. GILMAN, WOMEN AND ECONOMICS 257-69 (1898). 
48. Cowan, Housework: Why I Love/Hate My Clothes IVasher, Wash. Post , Feb. 15, 1987, 
at C3, col. I. Housewives spent fifty hours a week on housework in 1900, but sixty to 
seventy hours on housework in 1980. !d. See generally L. PEATTIE & M. REI N, WOMEN's 
CLAIMS: A STUDY IN PoLITICAL EcoNOMY (1983) (women's economic claims against state 
within family and in work world); THE PoLITICS OF HousEWORK (E. Malos ed. 1980) 
(essays examining effect of women's roles and relationships at home on their political 
status). 
49. Cowan, supra note 48. 
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centage of these women also have children to care forY> It is likely 
that parenting is still a greater day-to-day psychological burden on 
mothers than on fathers. The bearing these trends will prove to 
have on women's permanent entry into the public realm as equal 
panicipants and contributors remains to be seen. 
All of this suggests that, for the sake of privacy, women ought to 
take special care when deciding· whether to have children. Privacy 
has m any useful functions for individuals in a democratic society. 51 
More importantly, however, privacy is something human beings ap-
p ear to need5 2 for psychological well-being5 3 and for the develop-
ment of individuating traits called for by moral personhood and 
self-de termination. 5 4 Procreative rights do not automatically entail 
privacy and self-determination for women . Decisional privacy trans-
lates into opportunities for salutary, individual modes o f personal 
privacy only where , first , women' s deci sional freed om is not pre-
empted by insurmountable social barriers to the exercise of legally 
protected choice and, second, free women with a choice are willing 
to choose privacy. Procreative rights are tools women can use, and 
are already using, to create opportunities for privacy in private life. 
This is \·vhy privacy and decisional privacy cannot be dismissed as 
mere male ideology. 
B. Women Against Privacy 
Popular perspectives on women's psychology assert that women 
do not want privacy or liberty as men define it. 55 They want some-
thing better. It is maintained that women seek ongoing intimacy, 
50. According to U .S. Bureau of Labor and Bureau of the Census Statistics, in 1986, 
46.6 million American women, approximately 55%, were in the labor force. Of these, 
17.5 million had children and 13.8 million had husbands. Hacker, Women at JVork , N.Y. 
Rev. Books, Aug . 14, 1986, at 26, 29, 30. 
51. See generally A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 32-39 (1967) (personal autonomy, 
emotional release , self-evaluation, and limited and protected communica tion); Gavison, 
supra no te 11, a t 428-33 (secrecy, anonymity, and so litude). 
52. Cf B. MooRE, PRIVACY: STUDIES IN SociAL AND CuLTURAL HisToRY 73-80 (1984). 
According to Moore, privacy is not a need in the sense in which air and water are human 
needs, but it is a social need that arises in response to the desire to escape perceived 
threats and offensive intrusion. !d. 
53. Cf I. ALTMAN, supra note 13; C. ScHNEIDER, SHAME, ExPOSURE, AND PRIVACY 40-
55 ( 1977). 
54. Numerous theorists have located the value of privacy in its ability to create and 
enhance personhood. See, e.g. , Reiman, Privacy, Intimacy, and Personhood, 6 PHIL. & Pus. 
AFF. 26,39-44 (1976). See generally 13 NoMOS : PRIVACY, supra note 14 (essa ys on value of 
privacy in diverse cultures). 
55. See generally J. MILLER, TowARD A NEw PsYCHOLOGY OF WOMEN (1976) (exploring 
role of autonomy and related moral values in women's psychology); C. GILLIGAN, IN A 
DIFFER ENT Vor c E: PsYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AN D WOMEN's DEVELOPMENT (1982) (same) . 
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affiliation, and responsible community life rather than solitudinous 
and anonymous forms of privacy.56 
Virtually by definition, extreme and long-lasting conditions of pri-
vacy are inconsistent with ideals of intimacy, of community, and of 
moral responsibility. 57 To admit this is not to concede that women 
should reject solitudinous and anonymous forms of privacy. 
'Wrongful patterns and instances of privacy can be rejected on moral 
grounds without abrogating privacy itself. To evaluate privacy's 
worth, we need to make particularized inquiries into how privacy is 
being used. vVe need to consider the morally relevant implications 
of privacy's use in given contexts. 58 \'\!omen who seek and utilize 
opportunities for privacy, e.g., to rejuvenate or to cultivate talents, 
are women with something qualitatively better to offer others. A de-
gree of privacy in our lives can help to make us more fit for social 
participation. It can help us to contribute up to the level of our 
capacities. Procreative rights promote privacy by helping women 
preserve and create opportunities for privacy in the context of re-
sponsible lives. 
III. juDICIAL OvERREACHING 
A. Roe and Its Critics 
Roe v. Wade 5 9 and Doe v. Bolton 60 began the Supreme Court's artic-
ulation of a decisional privacy rationale for invalidating impermis-
sive state abortion laws. Subsequent Supreme Court cases have 
clarified the meaning and the limits of the constitutional right of 
privacy.61 The right was first applied against legal barriers to pro-
56. J. MILLER, supra note 55; C. GILLIGAN, supra note 55. 
57. Cf Boone, Privacy and Community, 9 Soc. THEORY & PRAC. 1 (1983) (assessing 
extent to which personal privacy is consistent with social values). 
58. Cf Weinstein, The Uses of Privacy in the Good Life, in 13 NoMos: PRIVACY, supra note 
14, at 92 (privacy cannot be dismissed as unconditionally immoral, as social alienation, 
as loneliness, etc.). Few moralists with clear-cut normative ethical theories have 
examined either privacy or decisional privacy closely. We could expect moral 
deontologists to consider the implications of privacy or decisional privacy for some 
categorical moral good, such as personhood. See, e.g., Reiman, supra note 54. Moral 
teleologists could be expected to consider the implications of privacy or decisional 
privacy for prescribed goals or purposes, such as the greater balance of enlightened 
happiness over unhappiness. See, e.g., J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY (1859) (utilitarian defense 
of extensive spheres of private choice). 
59. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
60. 410 u.s. 179 (1973). 
61. See Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 106 S. 
Ct. 2169 (1986); Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983); Akron v. 
Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983); Simopoulos v. 
Virginia, 462 U.S. 506 (1983); Williams v. Zbaraz, 448 U.S. 358 (1980); Harris v. McRae, 
448 U.S. 297 (1980); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979); Colautti v. Franklin, 439 
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creative choice in the Griswold case .ri:? Post-Roe cases have illumi-
nated the Court's understanding that the right of privacy is really an 
aspect of constitutionally protected liberty. The Court has inter-
preted the decisional privacy right as an aspect of negative liberty,63 
liberty powerful enough to countermand coercive legislative barri-
ers to procreative choice in the first two trimesters of pregnancy, but 
not powerful enough to require governmental funding for nonther-
apeutic abortions , even where such funding is available for child-
birth.6·1 The Court has held that minors have a constitutional 
privacy right protecting abortion choice. 65 However, it has under-
stood that right to be consistent with parental notification and con-
sent requirements motivated by paternalism in the case of girls who 
have not been adjudicated mature .6 6 
In broad outline , the Supreme Court's decisional privacy argu-
ment for permissive abortion policies can be simply stated. It starts 
with the premise that the Constitution protects important forms of 
liberty. Protected liberties include the liberty to make for oneself 
some of the choices that deeply affect personal identity, sexuality, 
U.S. 379 (!979); Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 
(1977 ); Bea l v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977) ; Custe v. Jackson, 429 U.S. 399 (1977); 
Franklin v. Fitzpatrick, 428 U.S. 901 (1976) , ovemded, Akron v. Akron Center for 
Reproductive Health, Inc. , 462 U.S. 416 (1983); Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1976); 
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); Connecticut v. Menillo , 423 U.S. 9 
(1975); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975). Cf Note, The 1983 Abortion Decisions: 
Clarification of the Permissible Limits of Abortion Regulation, 18 U. RICH. L. REv. 137 (1983) . 
62 . Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 4 79 (1965) (invalidating state statutes 
criminalizing contraception). 
63 . Cf S.I. BENN & R.S. PETERS, THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL THOUGHT 248-49 
(1959) (concepts of positive and negative liberty distinguished); L. TRIBE, supra note 23, 
at 889 (freedom cannot be protected by placing identified realms of thought beyond 
reach of government control; freedom cannot be defined wholly in negative language 
describing what government cannot do). 
64. Harris v. MacRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316-17 (1980) (due process liberty recognized 
in Roe does not encompass woman's entitlement to funds to avail herself of protected 
choices); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 4 74 (1977) (state may withhold funds for abortion 
even though childbirth would be funded). See generally Goldstein, A Critique of the Abm·tion 
Funding Decisions: On Private Rights in the Public Sector, 8 HASTINGS CoNST. L.Q 313 (1981) 
(discussing Afaher, Poelker, and McRae decisions and their impact on Roe). 
65. For a list of cases discussing minors' constitutional privacy right protecting their 
abortion choice, see supra note 38. 
66. See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S . 52, 7 5 (1976) (invalidity of blanket 
statutory restriction does not mean all minors may give consent to abortion regardless 
of age or maturity); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 643-44 ( 1979) (pregnant minor must 
show either sufficient maturity and informedness to make abortion decision, or that such 
decision is in her best interests); Akron v. Akron Cemer for Reproductive Health , Inc. , 
462 U.S. 416 , 439-40 (1983) (state must provide adequate procedures allowing minor to 
demonstrate sufficient maturity to exercise abortion rights without parental notification 
o r consent); Planned Parenthood Ass 'n v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S . 476,493-94 (1983) (statute 
allowing judicial consent on proof of sufficient maturity upheld). 
' i 
"' 
t 
l 
I 
1987] TAKING LIBERTIES 475 
marriage, p rocreation, the home, and family life. Choice whether to 
bear a child is just such a choice. State laws that criminalize and 
intrusively regulate abortion unlawfully interfere with constitution-
ally pro tected liberty. Only at the stage at which protecting fe tal life 
and maternal health becomes compelling may access to elective 
abortions be restricted. 6 7 
Simple to stZ! te iu broad o utline, the Court 's argumen t is harder 
to defend .68 T he argument relies upon the illusive concept o f feta l 
''viabi li ty. " At the time of Roe it was generally thought that a fe tus 
of twenty-eight v.;eeks could survive outside the womb. Medical ex-
perts report difficulty in pinpointing the date at which a fetus can be 
expected to survive ex utero. But some now place viability at twenty-
four weeks.69 IVIeanwhile, liberals and conservatives alike reject "vi-
ability" as the ethically critical moment when the state may assert a 
compelling interest in protecting fetal life and curtailing free 
cho ice .70 
T he Roe argument is also difficult to defend because it rests on 
complex normative and factual premises that implicate basic contro-
versies of American jurisprudence concerning standards of judicial 
review and constitutional interpretation.71 Roe's critics have alleged 
that its jurisprudential assumptions are a house of cards. 72 Admit-
67. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163 ("With respect to the State's important and legitimate 
interest in the health of the mother, the 'compelling' point .. . is at . . . the end of the 
first trimes te r. . . With respect to the State's important and legitimate inte rest in 
potentia l life , the 'compelling' point is at viability."). 
68. For dis cus sion of the legal and social issues posed by Roe, see generally 
ABORTION: !\-! ORAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 43 (legal and philosophical 
essays on moral, political, and legal problems of abortion); N. DAVIS, FRoM CRIME TO 
CHOICE (1985); THE LAW AND PoLITICS OF ABORTION (C. Schneider & M. Vinovskis eds. 
1980) (essays on public attitudes on abortion before and after Roe, analysis of voting 
behavior in presidential elections, abortion law before Roe, the fetus's legal status, and 
abortion funding cases); E. RuBIN, ABORTION, PoLITICS AND THE COURTS (1982); L. 
WARDLE, THE ABORTION PRIVACY DOCTRINE: A CoMPENDIUM AND CRITIQUE OF FEDERAL 
CouRT ABORTION CASES ( 1980) (source book on doctrine of abortion privacy) . 
69. CJ Grimes , Second- Trimester Abortions in the United States, 16 FAM . PLAN. PERSP. 260, 
264 (1984) (ex utero survival of fetus younger than 24 weeks not reliably documented). 
The Supreme Court has itself noted the disagreement among medical experts about the 
determination of the date of viability. See Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379,396 (1979). 
70. See, e. g., Englehardt, Viability, Abortion, and the Difference Between a FetllS and an 
Infant, 116 AM. J. 0BSTET. & GYNECOL. 429 (1973); Rhodern, Stubblefield, Benshoof & 
Callahan, Late Abortion and Technological Advances in Fetal Viability, 17 FAM. PLAN. Q 160 
(1985); Note, Genetic Screening, Eugenic Abortion, and Roe v. Wade: How Viable is Roe's 
Viability Standard?, 50 BROOKLYN L. REv. 113 ( 1983) (discussing whether state is entitled 
to restrict mother's decision to proceed with eugenic abortion in wake of Roe). 
71. R. DwoRKIN, LAw's EMPIRE, supra note 5, at 185-86, 355-99. 
72 . See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 23, at 927 ("[N]othing in the Supreme Court's 
opinion provides a satisfactory explanation of why the fetal interest should not be 
deemed overriding prior to viability .. .. ");Coleman, Roe v. Wade: A Retrospective Look at 
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ting that "[h]aving an unwanted child can go a long way toward 
ruining a woman's iife ," John Hart Ely described the jurisprudence 
implied by Roe's constitutional privacy argument as nothing less 
than " frightening. " 7 3 
David A.J. Richards, who has defended th e outcome of Roe and its 
reliance upon a constitutional right of dec1sional privacy against its 
formidab ie opponents, 74 explained that critics of the right-to-pri-
vacy doctrine pose a (Wofold conundrum. First: "How can constitu-
tional privacy , a right which is not textually rooted in any clause o f 
the written constitution, be inferred withjudicial fidelity to the inter-
pretation of the terms of the Constitution?" 7 5 And second: 
"[A]ssuming the right is textually based in some form, how can such 
textual inference by [sic] squared with basic premises of the political 
theory of democratic self-rule that sharply limit the scope of proper 
judicial invalidation of majority rule?" 7 6 Critics of Roe assert that its 
decisional privacy argumen t mistakes the limits of judicial review 
and implies an untenable nonmajoritarian political morality. 77 
Critics pose third and fourth interrogatories as well.78 Third: as-
suming, arguendo, that the Constitution is properly read to include a 
right of decisional privacy that can be applied to invalidate legisla-
ajudicial Oxymoron, 29 ST. Lours U.LJ. 7, 19-26,43 (1984) (survey of Roes critics) ("The 
Court cannot vindicate individual rights by permitting abortion on demand."); Smith, 
The Right to Privacy: Roe v. Wade Revisited, in 43 j uRIST 289, 316 (1983) (survey of Roe's 
critics) ("[The Court] failed to explain ... why the right of privacy includes the right to 
terminate a pregnancy. ") . 
73. Ely, supra note 17, a t 935·36. "What is frightening about Roe is that this super-
protected right is not inferable from the language of the Constitution, the framers' 
thinking respecting the specific problem in issue, any general value derivable from the 
provisions they included, or the nation's governmental structure." !d. (footnote 
omitted). 
74 . D. RICHARDS, supra note 3, at 23J.69. 
75. !d. at 232. 
76. !d. 
77. See, e.g., Ely, supra note 17, at 937,939 (in Roe as in Lochner v. New York, 198 
U.S. 45 (1905), Court manufactured constitutional right and used it to superimpose its 
own view of good social policy on legislature). See generally J. ELY, supra note 7 (judicial 
appeal to nonneutral principles violates majoritarian ideal of government). 
78. In Parts I and II of this Article I suggested answers to what amount to fifth and 
sixth interrogatories challenging the Court's right of decisional privacy jurisprudence. 
According to the fifth, Roe is flawed because the Court misconceived procreative liberty 
as privacy, when in fact the connection between abortion and privacy rights is "too 
tenuous and indirect to be credible." Sher, Subsidized Abortion: Moral Rights and Moral 
Compromise, 10 PHIL. & PuB. AFF. 361, 363 (1981). According to the sixth, Roe can be 
dismissed as "male ideology" because (I) it assumes that women have freedom of 
procreative choice once laws criminalizing abortion procurement and services are 
eliminated, because (2) women do not want privacy as men define it, or because (3) the 
sexually permissive culture Roe accommodates permits men to view and use women as 
sex objects. 
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tive enactments, how can that right be applied to invalidate laws 
prohibiting abortion, a practice that terminates human potential? 
Fourth: assuming that the due process clause protects decisional 
privacy as an aspect of liberty, how can it be concluded that the right 
to abort is a fundamental aspect of liberty, a fundamental right? 
Justices Rehnquist and \A/hite, who believe Roe ought to be over-
ruled , have concluded that a right to abort is not fundamental since 
"it seems apparent ... that a free, egalitarian, and democratic soci-
ety does not presuppose any particular rule or set of rules with r-e-
spect to abortion." 79 The contractarian analyses considered below 
illuminate why these Justices are mistaken about the fundamental 
requirements of freedom and equal treatment. Freedom and equal 
treatment do not presuppose the precise "viability"-limited trimes-
ter approach to abortion access Roe established, but they do presup-
pose abortion policies no less permissive. 
B. Answering the Critics 
How are the daunting challenges to Roe and its implicit jurispru-
dence to be answered? In delivering the opinion of the Court in 
Roe, Justice Blackmun asserted that the "Constitution does not ex-
plicitly mention any right of privacy. " 80 He grounded his belief in 
the existence of an unenumerated fundamental right of privacy on a 
line of cases he deemed indicative of constitutional protection for 
fundamental privacy interests. 81 Blackmun relied on cases concern-
ing the protection both of restricted access privacy interests82 and of 
decisional privacy83 interests.84 The cases he cited had been de-
79. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, I 06 S. Ct. 
2169, 2192 (1986) (White, J., dissenting, with Rehnquist, J., concurring in White's 
dissent). Justice White further stated, "I cannot agree ... that this liberty is so 
fundamental that restrictions upon it call into play anything more than the most minimal 
judicial scrutiny." !d. at 2194. 
80. Roe, 410 U.S. at 152. 
81. !d. (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1968); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 
347, 350 (1967); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965); Olmstead v. 
United States, 277 U.S. 438, 4 78 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Meyer v. Nebraska, 
262 U.S . 390, 399 (1923). 
82. In this category, I would include the Court's reference to leading fourth and fifth 
amendment cases, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1968), Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 
347, 350 (1967), and Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,478 (1928). 
83. In this category, I would include, for example, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 
479, 484-85 (1965) and Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). 
84. In doing so, Justice Blackmun could have been conflating privacy and decisional 
privacy due to an imprecise grasp of what privacy means and how it is used. Another 
explanation is that Blackmun's majority opinion, like Justice Douglas' concurrence in 
Roe, implicitly assumed what members of the Court now clearly understand. They 
understand that (1) the concept of privacy is used to refer both to restricted access 
privacy (privacy simpliciter) and decisional privacy (private choice), see Whalen v. Roe, 
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cided by appeal to various amendments and their "penumbras."85 
However, he was most persuaded that the fourteenth amendment 
promise of liberty was the source of the constitutional right to deci-
sional privacy.8 6 When he delivered the opinion of the Court in 
Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, Black-
mun's effort to link the right of privacy to constitutional liberty was 
more confident.87 
Blackmun's interpretation of the Constitution as embodying a 
substantive decisional privacy right through its guarantees of equal 
liberty has been criticized as reliance upon arbitrarily chosen non-
constitutional values .88 Critics taking a narrow view of judicial re-
view have sought to argue on jurisprudential, historical , and 
political grounds that the courts lack authority to decide cases in 
reliance upon what they (the critics) denigrate as natural law, sub-
stantive due process rights , subjective morality , or the shifting tides 
429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977), summarized supra note 12; and that (2) the fourteenth 
amendment guarantees pro tection of all of the "zones of privacy" implied by libe rty, cf. 
Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 106 S. Ct. 2169, 
2200 (1986) (White, J., dissenting), whe ther "zones of privacy" in the restricted access 
sense or "zones of privacy" in the decisional privacy sense. What members of the Court 
disagree about is whether abortion choice is an appropriately private affair protected by 
constitutional liberty . It is worth noting here that the "zone of privacy" metaphor 
Justice Douglas used in Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484 , and repea ted in his concurring opinion 
in Roe, 410 U.S. at 209, is an example of a use of "privacy" that does more to obscure 
than to elucidate its denotative meaning. 
85. The first , third , fourth , fifth, and ninth amendments, and their " penumbras" 
were pointed to as sources of privacy protection by Justice Douglas in the majority 
opinion in Griswold, 38 1 U.S. at 484-85 . Again, Douglas ' use of metaphor is obfuscating 
rather than clarifying. See supra note 84. This time it is the textual basis of the 
constitutional right to privacy rather than the denotative meaning of "privacy" that he 
needlessly mystified. 
86. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153. "This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the 
Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions on state action, as 
we feel it is, or, as the District Court determined, in the Ninth Amendment's reservation 
of rights to the people, is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or 
not to terminate the pregnancy." !d. 
87. 106 S. Ct. 2169, 2184-85 (1986). 
Our cases have long recognized that the Constitution embodies a 
promise that a certain private sphere of individual liberty will be kept 
largely beyond the reach of government. ... That promise extends to 
women as well as to men. Few decisions are more personal and intimate, 
more properly private, or more basic to individual dignity and autonomy, 
than a woman's decision .. . whether to end her pregnancy. A woman's 
right to make that choice is fundamental. Any other result , in our view, 
would protect inadequately a central part of the sphere of liberty that our 
law guarantees equally to all. 
!d. (citations omitted) . 
88. See, e.g. , Ely, supra note 17, at 948-49; Comment, justice Hmry A. Blackmun: The 
Abortion Decisions, 34 ARK. L. REv. 276, 296 (1980). 
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of public opinion. 89 However, judicial fidelity to the Constitution 
does not preclude recognition of unenumerated substantive individ-
ual rights. 90 A broad view of judicial review accepts "the courts' ... 
role as the expounder of basic national ideals of individual liberty 
and fair treatment, even when the content of these ideals is not ex-
pressed as a matter of positive law in the written Constitution."91 
The arguments for limiting constitutional adjudication by the lit-
eral interpretation of express provisions and by the historic intent of 
the Framers are unpersuasive. 92 If the Supreme Court has authority 
only within the "four corners" of the Constitution, then the 
Supreme Court has frequently erred for good . Judicial review could 
not have been adequately responsive to, for example, the demands 
of racial justice, were the Court limited by a "four corners" concep-
tion of review.93 It is unclear how the judiciary could take the Con-
stitution seriously if appellate review did not seek to bring about 
recognition and protection of the individual rights befitting the lib-
eral society so constituted. I would venture to say that the Court has 
maintained its institutional credibility by refusing to treat the Fram-
ers' specific intent as dispositive of substantive rights in areas where 
social and economic life have given rise to amplified, just expecta-
tions of individual freedom, equality, and participation. 
David A.J. Richards and Ronald Dworkin are among those legal 
philosophers who maintain that the judiciary cannot ignore substan-
tive normative background principles that give meaning and inter-
pretive coherence to the Constitution. In response to the twofold 
conundrum posed by critics, Richards crafted a theory stressing the 
powers of principled interpretation rather than the putative limita-
tions of judicial review. 
According to Richards, the intellectual history of the Constitution 
justifies appeal to nonenumerated fundamental background 
89. See, e.g., R. BERGER, supra note 7; Epstein, Substantive Due Process By Any Other 
Name: The Abortion Cases, 1973 SuP. CT. REv. 159, 185 (Supreme Court must be criticized 
for using constitutional interpretation in Roe that allows it to define and balance major 
social and political interests). 
90. Cf R. DwoRKIN, LAw's EMPIRE, supra note 5, at 397-99 (constitutional 
interpretation may remain sensitive to great complexity of political virtues bearing on 
issues). 
91. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REv. 703, 706 (1975). 
92. R. DwoRKIN, LAw's EMPIRE, supra note 5, at 359-73. 
93. See generally Grey, supra note 91. Moreover, "[t]he United States is a more just 
society than it would have been had its constitutional rights been left to the conscience 
of majoritarian institutions." R. DwoRKIN, LAw's EMPIRE, supra note 5, at 356. 
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rights. 94 Responding to the competing demands of tex t, history, 
politics, morality, and social change, Richards argued that strict con-
struct iv ism must be rejected in favor of a contractarian, fu ndamen-
tal-rights-based approach to interpretation. 95 On this approach, the 
Cons titution limits governmental constraints on conduct to those 
that rational persons could freely and unanimously accept. Richards 
d id not choose social contract theory solely by virt ue of any in-
dependent moral validity it may have . H e chose it because "[t]o un-
ders tand the self-conception of the American Constitution as a 
written constitution, legal interpreters must take seriously the con-
tractarian moral ideal of community that actuates it. " 96 Richards' 
theory can be understood as an effort to legitimate a co nceptio n of 
the Bill of Rights , the fo urteenth amendment, and other constitu~ 
tiona! clauses as a set of deontological contraints on government 
action , while at the same time showing respec t for th e Founders' 
intent for the form of government constituted by the written 
Cons ti tu tion . 
C. Abortion and Social Contract 
Richards argued that much of the text of the Constitution itself 
contemplated the inference of fundamental rights expres sive of a 
theme o f to lerance, including a right of privacy .97 He elaborated a 
94. D. ?,!CHARDS, supra note 3, at 255 ("The maintenance of a con tinuous yet vital 
constitutional tradition in the United States has requi red the Supreme Court to in terpret 
relevant consti tu tional text in terms of abstract background rights .... "). 
95. Why must strict constructivism be rejected? Richards elaborated five reasons. 
D. RICHARDS, supra note 3, at 34-37 . First, the language of the Constitution is abstract; 
second , it is not reasonable in view of the abstract language employed to a ttempt to limit 
the language of the Constitution by its historic denotations; third, constitutional clauses 
derive their force and meaning from a larger political and moral culture that perceived 
the human rights embodied in these clauses as grounded in enduring and inviolable 
principles of justice; fourth , coherent interpretation of American constitutional law 
requires a historically self-conscious understanding both of the Founders ' self-
conception of their place in the history of republican thought , and of the interpre ta tive 
development of constitutional doctrine over time; and fifth, strict constructivism is tied 
to a politically indefensible brand of legal positivism. !d. 
96. !d. at 55. See also id. at 54, 55-56. 
The idea of a written constitution does no t arise in a historical and 
cultural vacuum. It flows out of deep currents in Western political and 
religious thought, and the moral ideal to which both political and 
religious thought points is contractarian .... The American Constitution 
.. represents a historically unique attempt to use the best political 
theory and political science of the age, combined with a di verse practical 
experience of democratic self-rule, to create a written text of constraints 
on state power that would achieve in America what had never been 
achieved elsewhere .... 
!d. at 54-56 (footnotes omitted) . 
97. D. RICHARDS , supra note 3 , at 256. 
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contrac tarian theory of the Constitution according to which a right 
to a sphere of private choice is a common good and a fundamental 
human right [hat a morally tolerant government may not ab ridge. 
As an example of the liberal contractarian treatment of abortion 
rights, I want to fo cus on Richards' view of why abortion rights must 
be deemed fundamental privacy rights for purposes of judicial re·-
view. Richards' liberal social contract theory is responsive to moral 
and political concerns about antiabortion laws commonly voiced by 
feminists (including feminists who are not liberal social comracta ri-
ans). I believe Richards is right tha t abortion privacy rights m ust be 
deemed fundamental, bur his account of the reason why they are 
fimdamental is not convincing. 
Feminisrn is sometimes construed as having its own permissive 
moral stance on abortion . vVhat I shall refer to as the feminist moral 
stance on abortion has liberal,98 egalitarian,99 and Kantian 100 
strands. First, feminism argues that whether women themselves 
choose w have children ought to be the determining factor in 
whether they are subj ected to pregnancy and childbirth. 101 \Vomen 
have the inviolable right to choose freely. This choice-emphatic 
claim is the liberal strand. Second, feminism argues that denial of 
freedom of choice to women entails that government fails to take 
seriously women's claims for equal treatment and full participation 
in society. 102 This equal-rights-emphatic objection is the egalitarian 
strand. Third, feminism argues that denial of choice treats women 
with moral disrespect. 103 Denial of procreative choice implies that it 
is fitting that women should be instruments of others' ends rather 
than persons in their own right. Women who are expected to live 
98. For a definition of liberalism, see supra note 6. 
99. An ega litarian approach to social, political, or legal theory prescribes that, to the 
extent possible , persons ought to be treated as equals. Needless to say, concep tions of 
wha t treatment as equals requires vary grea tly . Ronald Dworkin's writings, cited 
exte nsively in this Art icle, reflect a commitment to egalitarianism. 
l 00. "Kantian" is used generically here to describe the anti-utilitarian perspective that 
persons are ends in themselves worthy of mo ral respect. Kant ascribed to human anors 
an absolute, categorical moral duty to refrain from treating persons as if they were mere 
things: "Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the 
person of another, always at the same time as an end and never simply as a means." I. 
KA NT, GROUND ING FOR A METAPHYSIC OF r.'fORALS 36 (J. Ellington trans . 1980). 
101. See Gould, Private Rights and Public Virtues: Women, The Family and Democracy, in 
BEYOND DoMINATION: NEw PERSPECTIVES ON WoMEN AND PHILOSOPHY 3, 13 (C. Gould 
ed . 1983) ("The right to abortion follows from the right to freedom of choice .... "). 
102. K. LuKER, ABORTION AND THE PoLITICs oF MoTH ERHOOD 92 (1984) ("[T]hey 
argued that this right to abortion was essential to their right to equality. "). 
103. !d. (abort io n right demanded was righ t to be treated as individuals rather than as 
potential mo thers) . See generally E. KLEIN, GENDER PoLITICS 47-68 (1984) (survey of 
fe minists' moral beliefs respec tin g birth control and motherhood). 
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lives as wives and mothers-whether or no t they prefer to-are used 
by government and the male-dominated society. This is the Kantian 
strand. 
H ow may the Supreme Court's treatment of private abortion 
righ ts as fundamental be defended? How can we justify not leaving 
the matter to individual states and their maj oritarian legislative insti-
tutions to decide ? T he problem with criminalizing abortion , Rich-
ards argued, is that it debases moral independence .104 To make 
abortion a crime is to hold women hostage to beliefs they reason-
ably rej ect about the value of fe tal life. Richards' account 105 of the 
respec ts in which abortion restrictions debase moral independence 
is deeply responsive to the three strands of feminist concern. 106 His 
emphasis on "the moral independence of ·women as free and ra-
tional persons," expressed through private choice, is responsive to 
the liberal strand in the feminist stance . The contention that such 
private choice is required by the elimination of "gender hierarchy" 
is responsive to the egalitarian strand. The insistence that women 
and their bodies are no t " the property of others," to be put to use in 
the service of others' ends, is responsive to the Kantian or anti-utili-
tarian strand. 
104. D. RrcHARDS, supra note 3, at 268. 
T he traditional condemnati on of abortion fail s, at a deep ethical level, to 
take seriously the moral independence of women as free and rational 
persons , lend ing the fo rce of law to theological ideas of biological 
naturalness and gender hie rarchy that degrade the constructi ve moral 
powers of wo men themselves to es tablish the meaning of their sexual and 
reproducti ve life histories . T he underl ying conception appears to be no t 
discontinuous wi th the sexist idea that women 's minds and bodies are not 
their own, but the prope rty of others, namely, men or their masculine 
God, who may use them and their bodies for the grea ter good. The 
abortion choice is thus one of the choices essential to the just moral 
independence of women , centering their lives in a body image and 
aspirations expressive of their moral powers. T he abortion choice is 
clearly a just applica ti on of the constitutional right to privacy, because the 
right to the abortion choice protects women from the traditional 
degradation of their moral powers , reflec ted in the assumptions 
underlying antiabortion laws. 
!d. (footnotes omitted) . 
105. Richards ' argument is quo ted supra note 104. 
106. I do not think this point is trivialized by the fact that, like Richards , some of the 
most influential liberal , egalitarian , and Kantian thinkers also embraced some form of 
social contract theory . For example, liberal egalitarian J ohn Rawls is also a 
contractarian. See generally J . RAWLS, A THEORY OF juSTI CE 11-17, 60-65 ( 1971) 
(cooperating individuals under ideal hypothetical conditions select two basic principles 
of justice for assigning ri ghts and duties and dividing social benefits: each person has 
equal right to basic liberty compatible with liberty for o thers, and social and economic 
inequalities are to be to everyone's advantage and to be attached to positions open to 
all) . Kant accepted elements of social contract theory. H . WILLIAMS, KANT's PoLITICAL 
PHI LOSOPHY 97-114 , 162-82 (1 983). 
1987] TAKING LIBERTIES 483 
The responsiveness of Richards' account to major strands in the 
feminist abortion stance is not a reason to conclude that the feminist 
stance is essentially contractarian. As a matter of fact, Richards' 
perspective on the respects in which abortion prohibitions debase 
moral independence is not itself essentially contractarian. Notwith-
standing its consistency with his inventive articulation of social con-
tract theory as the political morality underlying the Constitution, 
Richards' account lacks uniquely contractarian premises. It is rather 
a composite of generically liberal, egalitarian, and Kantian claims. 
While Richards' conception of how lack of abortion choice debases 
moral independence is not uniquely contractarian, elements of his 
actual argument against antiabortion laws are uniquely con-
tractarian. Ironically, the weakest element of Richards' abortion ar-
gument may be weak because he overlooks a serious requirement of 
his own contractarianism: namely, the need for a contractarianjusti-
fication for leaving out the fetal point of view. 
What makes fetal survival so unimportant that fetuses may be ter-
minated by women in the exercise of their independent moral pow-
ers? Why is abortion not unlawful murder, justly prohibited under 
state law? Richards maintained that fetuses are neither persons sub-
ject to protection by government in virtue of possessing moral per-
sonality, nor general goods subject to government protection as 
n umbering among those things rational persons would unanimously 
agree merit protection. Fetuses are not persons, he asserted, be-
cause to be a person one must have the "relevant characteristics of 
... a person-at a minimum, the capacity for self-consciousness, 
agency, and the like." 107 Fetuses are not general goods because, 
according to the theory of general goods, 108 the lives of nonpersons 
could be general goods only if they were "so necessary to the lives 
of all rational people that each person could reasonably accept nec-
essary protections of such goods by the criminal law even at the cost 
of essential interests in moral independence." 109 The interest in 
moral independence is essential because moral independence is a 
prerequisite of meaningful moral personhood. As a prerequisite of 
moral personhood, moral independence is presupposed by the ideal 
of the free and democratic society. In a society of rational and free 
citizens, moral independence must be a fundamental right. That is, 
107. D. RICHARDS, supra note 3, at 264. 
108. The theory of general goods is the component of social contract theory "which 
expresses the kind of . . . constraints imposed on [govermental] abridgment of 
conscience and privacy." !d. at 267. 
109. !d. 
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it must be a right that cannot be trumped by arguments of social 
utility or majority preferences. 
The termination of fetal life is not a legally cognizable harm under 
the social contract.arian theory Richards advances because fetuses 
lack moral personality and their survival is not a general good. On 
the other hand, because moral independence is a general good, 
·women are harmed when they are deprived of moral independence 
by antiabortion iaws that policy-makers justify by appeal to a state 
interes t in protecting fetal life or to majoritarian preferences. An-
tiabortion legislation unconstitutionally abridges women's fund-
amental right to moral independence in the appropriately private 
sphere of procreative autonomy. 
Richards did not offer an explicit social contractarian argument 
for his conclusion that fetuses are nonpersons. Surprisingly, he re-
lied on bare assertion. 110 He did offer an explicit contractarian ar-
gument for his conclusion that, since fetuses are nonpersons, 
government may not protect their lives by criminalizing abortion. 
In that instance he relied on a contractarian theory of general 
goods. 111 
As a contractarian Richards owes us an account of why potential 
persons should be excluded from the right-bearing class. 112 In pro-
viding such an account, the contractarian faces the special problem 
of explaining why fetuses are not parties to the hypothetical unani-
mous agreements that justify and limit government action. To be 
sure, fetuses lack rationality, self-consciousness, moral agency, and 
other traits that are the hallmarks of human personhood. The social 
contract is typically conceived as a hypothetical bargain struck by 
the aggregate of those affected by the exercise of power. That fe-
tuses in the actual world are not rational moral agents does not ex-
plain why, in the hypothetical world to which the contractarian 
appeals where many features of the actual world are suspended, the 
point of view or self-interests of human fetuses should not be ac-
corded the same weight as those of human beings at other stages of 
development. It is a powerful moral intuition that arbitrary contin-
110. ld. at 264. I gather from correspondence with Richards that he asserts that 
fetuses are not persons on the strength of his conviction that abortion is not murder. 
Letter from David A.J. Richards to Anita Allen (Mar. 21, 1987). But, of course, to those 
who believe abortion is murder to which we have allowed ourselves to grow indifferent, 
and to those who are uncertain, Richards' assertion must seem to lack adequate 
justification. 
Ill. ld. at 267. John Rawls' contractarian account of the principles ofjustice included 
an equivalent theory, that is, the theory of"primary goods." J. RAWLS, supra note 106. at 
90-95. 
112. Rawls sketched such an account. .J. RAWLS, supra note 106, at 509. 
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genci es cannot be treated as relevant when we seek to do justice. 
Thus , for example, sex is now deemed irrelevant when voting rights 
are allocated. Significantly, noted contractarianjohn Rawls has sug-
ges ted that potential personhood is a minimally sufficient condition 
for moral personality. Rawls suggested that it is an arbitrary contin-
gency that potential persons are not now the persons they could 
be . I t 3 
To shore up the applica tion of his contractarian constitutional 
theory to the abortion controversy, Richards must give a con-
tractarian argument for leaving out the fetal point of view. For pro-
life Roe critics, the nature of the argument Richards would use to 
justify leaving out the fetal point of view is critically important to the 
plausibility of his abortion jurisprudence. The nature of that argu-
ment is also extremely important to critics like Ely who worry that 
Roe entails an unprincipled allocation of extraordinary private pow-
ers to one group (women) over another group (fetuses) that is virtu-
ally unrepresented in the democratic process. 1 14 Indeed, the view 
that Roe arbitrarily leaves out the interests of the pre-viable unborn 
has been a major criticism of Roe's permissiveness and the permis-
siveness entailed by the feminist moral stance on abortion. 115 
I join those who contend on various grounds that whether fetuses 
are persons vel non is not dispositive of the morality and legality of 
abortion. 116 Permissive abortion rights are called for even though 
fe tuses have, or may have, moral personality. The abortion problem 
compels a squaring off of human potential-women's potential ver-
sus the potential of unborn life. The duel is between women's 
rights to the realization of their potential as human persons and (I 
am assuming) fetal rights to the same. 
11 3. !d. ("I have said that the minimal requirements defining moral personality refer 
to a capacity and not to the realization of it. A being that has this capacity, whether or 
not it is yet developed , is to receive the full protection of the principles of justice.") . 
114 . See generally J. ELY, supra note 7; Ely, supra note 17, at 933-35 (although few 
women sit in on legislation, no fetuses do). 
115. See, e.g., Swan, The Thirteenth Amendment Dimensions of Roe v. Wade, 4 J. Juv. L. 1 
(1980) . Cf Dorsen, Cmshing Freedom in the Name of Life, 10 HuM . RTs . 19 (1982) (critical 
analysis of implications of proposal that Constitution be amended to declare the unborn 
persons within meaning of Constitution); Westfall, Beyond Abortion: The Potential Reach of a 
Human Life Amendment, 8 AM . J.L. & MED. 98 (1982) (same) . 
116. See, e.g., Thomson, supra note 35; Smith, Rights-Conflict, Pregnancy, and Abortion, 
in BEYOND DoMINATION, supra note 101, at 264 (women's right of liberty overrides fetal 
welfare rights) . But see Gould, supra note 101 , at 13 ("If abortion did involve destruction 
of the life of a human being, this would justify limitations on a woman 's freedom to 
decide on an abortion.") ; accord Feinberg, Abortion, in MATTERS OF LIFE AND DEATH 183 
(T. Regan ed . 1980). 
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Valuable human potential is lost whether woman abort or whether 
they do not abort. The one and a half million abortions performed 
annually in the United States terminate a great deal of potential. 
But they promote a great deal of more distinct human potential as 
self-determining women are permitted to pursue education, spare 
their health, avoid child abuse and neglect, and focus on contribu-
tions outside the domestic sphere. Setting aside the ques tion of 
rights for a moment, there would seem to be ample :reason to prefer 
loss of fetal potential to loss of women's potential. From o. public, 
goal-oriented perspective, society is better off if it adopts a legal poi-
icy choice favoring women's potential to that of fetuses. Surely it is 
better to have a society enriched because men and women each have 
the requisites of self-determination, participation as equais, and 
contributions up to their innate capacities, than simply to have a so-
ciety of more people. There is something tragically absurd too, like 
th e myth of Sisyphus, about a woman who is stunted by domestic 
and maternal roles, for the sake of unborn daughters who will grow 
up and face merely the same fate. 
The nonconsequentialist argument for preferring women's poten-
tial to fetal potential is that it is inherently wrong to force women to 
sacrifice the realization of their potential so that others may realize 
theirs. Vvhy is it wrong? Pro-choice liberals 117 who are bent on 
searching for neutral principles seek to justify abortion on the 
ground that abortion rights protect appropriately private affairs re-
lated to the inviolable body and personal identity. Or, they rely on 
the ground that the state cannot justly limit liberty on the basis of 
religious beliefs about the status of fetuses. Or, they appeal to the 
view that the state may not limit liberty on the basis of metaphysical 
beliefs about fetal status that are not proven and may not be subject 
to proof. 
Ronald Dworkin's conception of liberal equality and the neutral 
constraints it entails has a contractarian dimension. 118 It can be ex-
ploited to provide Richards with the contractarian argument his per-
missive abortion rights argument needs. Unlike Richards, Dworkin 
has not aligned himself with social contractarianism as a political 
morality in terms of which the Constitution may be directly inter-
preted. But his affinity for social contractarian liberalism is appar-
ent in the contractarian test he proposed in A Matter of Principle for 
117. See generally Voegel, A Critique of the Pro-Choice /llgument, 43 REv. PoL. 560 (1981) 
(critical survey of liberal pro-choice arguments) . 
11 8. R. DwoRKIN, A MATIER OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 5, at 205. But cf Dworkin, The 
Original Position, in READING RAWLS, supra note 4, at 16 (criticizing Rawls' conception of 
social contract). 
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determining whether government action (or inaction) passes mus ter 
with th e liberal conception of equality. To preserve the constitutive 
principle of equal respect and concern, government " must impose 
no sacrifice or constraint on any citizen in virtue of an argument that 
the citi zen could not accept without abandoning his sense of equal 
worth ." tt 9 
Dworkin did not apply this abstract constraint of equal respect to 
abortion. However, he did indicate that its applica tion would op-
pose the moralism of the so-called Moral Majority and the New 
Ri ght. 12 0 Throughout the 1980s, individuals identified by these la-
bels have stood in opposition to abortion choice and demanded that 
Roe be overturned. As I interpret Dworkin's principle of equal re-
spect, its application to the case of abortion rights yields a result 
that strongly favors decisional privacy for women. Specifically, an-
tiabortion laws are morally and constitutionally invalid because the 
usual arguments of fe tal potentiality, reli gion, or metaphysical un-
certainty cannot be accepted by women without abandoning their 
sens e of equal worth. To accept their pregnancy hardships by virtue 
of the fetal potentiality argument, women would have to accept the 
inference that their own potential is less important than the poten-
tial of the unborn. To accept the religious and moral arguments 
based on the value of fetal life and the family, women would have to 
accept that their own individual beliefs and moral consciences de-
serve no weight even though it is their lives that are most directly 
affected by the outcome of pregnancy. 
Dworkin 's contractarian conception of the requirements of equal-
ity gives rise to an argument for permissive abortion laws that avoids 
the problem uncovered in Richards' argument. The Dworkin-in-
spired contractarian argument does not assume that fetuses lack 
moral personality. It forces us to consider the morality of imposing 
both pregnancy sacrifices on women and abortion sacrifices on fe-
tuses. Antiabortion legislation places a constraint on the pregnant 
woman by virtue of arguments she cannot accept without aban-
doning her sense of equal worth. The same is not true of permissive 
abortion legislation and the fetus. Abbreviated potential is a sacri-
fice the law imposes by virtue of an argument the fetus could rea-
sonably accept without abandoning its sense of equal worth, simply 
through appreciation of the equal worth of the pregnant woman by 
whom it must be borne and her potential as a person. Preferring 
continued life to aborted life, the hypothetical reasonable fetus also 
119. R. DwoRKIN, A MAlTER OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 5, a t 205. 
120. !d. 
488 CINCINNA TI L1 W R EVIE W [Vol. 56 
prefers state protection to procrea tive choice. But, as our fetus un-
derstands , pl acing its fa te in the hands of an individual woman is 
justified because it does no t have to believe itself less worthy of re-
spec t than other human beings in order to accept that th e law will 
not compel women to see each pregnancy to term. 
Speculation abou t what a reasonable fe tus could and could no t 
accept without abandoning its se nse of equal worth is admittedly 
strained. Bu t the awkward contractarian exercise proves to have a 
m orally interes ting result. It illuminates why impermissive abo rt ion 
laws that would limit women' s potential as persons are morally less 
problematic than permiss ive abortion laws that limit fetal poten tial. 
A great deal has been written about the problem of rights con-
fli cts under social contrac t theory. 12 1 A great deal has also been 
written about the co nflict of r igh ts at stake in competing abortion 
policies. 122 What I have sought to contribute are the outlines of a 
contractarian rationale for viewing claims based on fetal well-bein g, 
potential, or righ ts as overcome by women 's claims to the same 
rights. 
Dworkin' s conception of what equality requires is responsive to 
the liberal , egalitarian, and Kantian strands in the feminist moral 
stance on abortion . I suspect some feminists would rej ect liberal 
contractarian arguments for procreative choice even though they 
are responsive to key feminist concerns and even though, if Rich-
ards proves correct , they have special relevance to American consti-
tutionalism. Social contrac tarian arguments are burdened by the 
assumption that the search for principles o f justice proceeds by ab-
stract appeal to what rational individuals could all accept or agree 
to . (Dworkin 's contractarian interpretation of liberal equality justi-
fies state constraint , not by appeal to unanimous rational acceptance 
as such, but by appeal to rational acceptance in principle without 
loss of the sense of equal worth.) What is good about this is that it 
gives play to ideals of consensual, participatory, and egalitarian gov-
ernment. But some women are now contending that the demands 
of justice must be determined, not abstractly, but contextually; no t 
from the point of view of neutral principles, but from the point of 
view of moral responsibilities that arise by virtue of actual social re-
121. See, e.g., H. BLOC KE R & E. S MITH, supra note 4; M. SANDEL , supra no te 4; Lyons, 
supra note 4. 
122 . See, e.g. , J ones , Abor tion and the Consideration of Funda mental, h-reconcilab{e Interests, 33 
SYRACUSE L. REv. 565 (I 982) (advocating pos ition that fetus ' interes t in po tentialit y o f 
life is at odds with woman's interes t in controlling her life). 
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lations and conditions. 123 Both feminist 124 and non feminist 125 theo-
rists have rejected social contract theory on essentially these 
grounds. 
Social contract theory bases the allocation of rights and duties on 
conceptions of what the abstract reasonable person could accept. 
The concepts of "reasonabl e person" and "rational acceptance" are 
no doubt affected by prevaiiing social standards. In our society men 
are the politically, economically, and socially dominant sex. In the 
early years of the women's movement there were feminists who pur-
ported to rejec t rationality because they viewed it as an ideological 
construct used as a device of oppress ion to keep the irrational sex 
out of public life. 126 To the extent that it sti il exists, the antiration-
alist segment of the feminist community could be expected to balk 
at social contract theory on the ground that any contractarian con-
ception ofjustice would presuppose a pernicious "male" view of the 
reasonable person and further sexual injustice. Contemporary aca-
demic feminists do not typically go to the extreme of rejecting ra-
tionality itself. However, some feminist scholars believe liberal 
social contract theory should be rejected because it overemphasizes 
rationality, pretends to value-neutrality, and assumes an unrealistic 
conception of persons as abstract, self-sufficient individuals. 127 
Contractarianism does not wholly collapse in the face of these 
now familiar charges of fundamental error. It is not a sufficient ref-
utation of social contract theory to point out the obvious: that the 
method of hypothetical reasoning it employs characterizes persons 
abstractly when, in important respects, real individuals are insepara-
ble from their personalities, values, social ties, and material con-
texts . Moreover, it has been plausibly argued that a nonneutral 
value-equal respect and concern-undergirds the best liberal, and 
presumably liberal contractarian, theories. 128 Opponents of social 
contract theory must explain why hypothetical abstraction about 
what individuals could accept is incapable of illuminating moral re-
123. Harding, Is Gender a Variable in Conceptions of Rationality? A Survey of Issues, in 
BEYOND DOMINATION, supra note 101 , at 43, 54 (rationality not gender-neutral concept), 
56 (although thought is formal and abstract, concept of justice could reflect specific 
social experiences). 
124. J aggar, Human Biology in Feminist Th eory: Sexual Equality Reconsidered, in BEYOND 
DoMINATION, supra note 101, at 21. 24 (credibility of social contract theory derives from 
implausible assumptions about human nature and reason). 
125. See, e.g., M. SANDEL, supra note 4 (nonfeminist philosophical criticism of Rawls 
and Dworkin). 
126. See Harding, supra note 123, at 44, 45 (explaining feminist opposition to concep t 
of rati onality). 
127. See, e.g., J aggar, supra note 124, a t 24-27. 
128 . R. DwoRKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE, mpra note 5, at 203-04. 
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sponsibilities or rights and why neutral principles are not justly em-
ployed in the pursuit of treatment as equals . Especially if Richards is 
correct that social contract theory has a privileged role to play in 
constitutional interpretation, 129 we should not quickly dismiss ef-
forts to rely upon it to clarify the need for privacy and private 
choice . 
CoNcLusiON 
David Richards is correct in his identification of toleration as a 
major constitutional theme. I believe he is also correct in his argu-
ment that constitutional toleration requires decisional privacy 
rights, especially procreative decisional privacy rights. Antiabortion 
arguments discount the moral importance to women of decisional 
p rivacy. Arguments for abortion choice are often premised on the 
importance of decisional privacy. But they typically under-
emphasize or ignore the link in women's lives between private 
choice and privacy, between decisional privacy and opportunities for 
individual forms of personal privacy. 
Imbedded in Richards' argument from the constitutional theme of 
toleration is an argument from the theme of self-determination. No 
human being is perfectly self-determining. But, for the sake of the 
degree of self-determination that makes personhood and responsi-
ble moral agency meaningful expectations, government must be tol-
erant of individual free speech, belief, and conduct. 
Recognition of the theme of self-determination implicit in the 
constitutional theme of toleration highlights why sexual and procre-
ative liberties are much more than necessary evils. Abortion rights 
are sometimes portrayed as necessary evils, even by members of the 
Supreme Court who support Roe. 130 They are depicted as evils 
129. Richards ' writings on this topic include lnte7pretation and Historiography, 58 S. CAL 
L. REv. 489 (1985); The Aims of Constitutional Theory, 8 U. DAYTON L. REv. 723 (1983); 
!vforal Philosophy and the Search for Fundamental Values in Constitutionall.aw, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 
319 (1981 ); The Individual, The Family, and the Constitution: A jurisprudential Perspective, 55 
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1 (1980); Human Rights as the Unwritten Constitution: The Problem of Change 
and Stability in Constitutional Interpretation, 4 l I. DAYTON L. REv. 295 ( 1979); see also 
Richards , Taking Rights Seriously: Reflections on Dworkin and the American Revival of 1'/atural 
Law, 52 N.Y.U. L. REv.1265 (1977). 
130. I have in mind Justice Stevens' concurring opinion in Thornburgh. 
The majority remains free to preach the evils of birth control and 
abortion and to persuade others to make correct decisions .... 
In the final analysis, the holding in Roe v. Hiade presumes that it is far 
better to permit some individuals to make incorrect decisions than to 
deny all individuals the right to make decisions that have a profound 
effect upon their destiny. 
Thornburgh, 106 S. Ct. at 2189-90 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
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needed to combat the even greater evils of unjustified state power 
and encroachment upon the appropria tely private sphere . They are 
seen as rights women must be accorded , but begrudgingly, with the 
hope that they will do the correct thing and not exercise them . 
Stressing the importance of privacy, I propose a more affirmative 
understanding of abortion rights. Women must have legally pro-
tec ted decisional privacy, and then be socially empowered to choose 
privacy in the form of salutary conditions of restricted access . The 
iibera l conception of sexual equali ty is scarcely furthered by deci-
sional privacy if women do not and cannot use their private choice 
to choose privacy . Merely having a legal right to choose does not 
insure meaningful moral independence. That comes from modes of 
education, work, and homelife that include opportunities for indi-
vidual forms of personal privacy. \Vomen can use these opportuni-
ties to work out and to live out their own conceptions of the good 
life . 
